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One barrier to more widespread adoption of differentially private neural networks
is the entailed accuracy loss. To address this issue, the relationship between neural
network architectures and model accuracy under differential privacy constraints
needs to be better understood. As a first step, we test whether extant knowledge
on architecture design also holds in the differentially private setting. Our findings
show that it does not; architectures that perform well without differential privacy,
do not necessarily do so with differential privacy. Consequently, extant knowledge
on neural network architecture design cannot be seamlessly translated into the
differential privacy context. Future research is required to better understand the
relationship between neural network architectures and model accuracy to enable
better architecture design choices under differential privacy constraints.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy has become the de facto standard for achieving data confidentiality in machine
learning settings. The most prominent way to train differentially private neural networks is by clipping
gradients in order to limit the impact of each data point and by adding noise to the gradient updates
[2]. While gradient clipping is also used in non-private training to avoid overfitting [18], adding
noise inherently reduces the accuracy of the machine learning model [10]. This is considered as
a trade-off between utility and differential privacy guarantees and is usually measured as accuracy
loss, describing the difference between the accuracy with and without differential privacy constraints.
Even on comparably simple tasks, such as the CIFAR-10 classification task, the accuracy loss can be
significant. This hinders the adoption of differentially private neural networks.
It is well known, that the architecture of a neural network can have a significant influence on the
accuracy of the model. For example, expanding the size of a network in depth rather than width is
usually said to increase accuracy [7], but also novel architectural features such as residual or dense
connections can vastly improve model accuracy [8, 9]. Yet, early works on differentially private
neural networks do not seem to account for this in great detail. They either do not include different
architectures in their benchmarks [10] or find that the effect is not significant [2]. There is, however,
also contrary evidence. For instance, expanding the overall size of the network in a differentially
private setting exhibits an inflection point [14]. Increasing the network size beyond this inflection
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point reduces model accuracy, which is not the case in the plain setting. Furthermore, the choice of
an activation function plays an important role. Bounded activation functions (e. g., tanh) consistently
outperform unbounded ones (e. g., ReLU) due to the phenomena of exploding activations during
differentially private training [15].
Nevertheless, even with these findings taken into account, there still remains a significant gap between
the accuracy of differentially private and non-private neural networks, even on simple tasks. Extant
research has already shown that the choice of an appropriate activation function differs between the
non-private and differentially private setting and that choosing an activation function appropriate for
differentially private neural networks can reduce the incurred accuracy loss [15]. However, there are
a multitude of other architectural features, such as the number, ordering, type and configuration of
layers, whose impact on model accuracy under differential privacy constraints has not been really
understood. Consequently, we investigate whether architectural features other than the activation
function of a neural network affect the accuracy loss incurred by differential privacy constraints.
If we can show that more architectural features than the activation function impact model accuracy,
this would imply that the accuracy of differentially private models can be improved by carefully
tuning a neural network architecture for differential privacy instead of simply copying architectures
and hyperparameters that work well without differential privacy constraints [17].
We designed and carried out an experiment to test whether the architecture affects accuracy loss
under differential privacy constraints. Our findings show, not only, that the network architecture
has an influence on the accuracy loss incurred by differential privacy constraints, but also, that the
suitability of architecture choices is sensitive to variations in the targeted level of differential privacy.
We elaborate the implications of our findings and argue what future research is necessary to reduce
the accuracy loss incurred by differential privacy constraints in order to improve the applicability of
privacy-preserving machine learning.
2 Background
Differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) is an algorithm for training neural
networks with (ε, δ)-differential privacy guarantees [2, 5]. DP-SGD extends classic stochastic
gradient descent in two ways. First, gradients are clipped on a per-example basis to a l2 norm, which
is set through a clipping threshold C. Second, random noise is added to the gradient update calibrated
via the standard deviation σ, also called noise multiplier. Thus, DP-SGD adds two additional
hyperparameters to the training algorithm.
The privacy level (ε, δ) of a model trained with DP-SGD is dependent on the batch size, the noise
multiplier, the number of epochs, and the number of training examples. Hence, the privacy level
for a given set of these hyperparameters can be calculated upfront without the need to actually train
the model. Since the privacy level is independent of the architecture of a given model, different
architectures can be compared at a fixed privacy level.
3 Experiments
In order to answer our research question, we need to show that the architecture of a neural network
does have an effect on the model’s accuracy loss under differential privacy constraints. We hypothesize
that given a set of neural architectures for a given machine learning task, the architecture which
performs best without differential privacy constraints does not necessarily also performs best under
differential privacy constraints. Or formulated differently, let there be two neural network architectures
A1 and A2 and let U(A) denote the accuracy of architecture A without differential privacy and
Ud(A) the accuracy with differential privacy. We assume the case exists that U(A1) > U(A2) and
Ud(A1) < Ud(A2).
To test our hypothesis, we conducted an experiment on the standard CIFAR-10 image classifica-
tion task which contains 60000 color images in 10 classes [11]. We used Tensorflow [1] and the
Tensorflow-Privacy extension [3] as machine learning libraries for the implementation. For our
experiments we chose 8 convolutional neural network architectures, including prominent examples
from the literature such as the LeNet-5 [12], but also architectures from other well-cited works
[4, 13, 16] and own creations. The architectures differ mostly in the size and number of convolution,
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Table 1: The architectures used for the experiment
#1 #2
Layer type Parameters Layer type Parameters
Convolution 32 filters of 3x3, ReLU Convolution 32 filters of 3x3, ReLU
Max-Pooling 2x2 Max-Pooling 2x2
Convolution 64 filters of 3x3, ReLU Convolution 64 filters of 3x3, ReLU
Fully connected 64 units, ReLU Max-Pooling 2x2
Softmax 10 units Convolution 64 filters of 3x3, ReLU
Fully connected 64 units, ReLU
Softmax 10 units
#3 #4, [12] but with ReLU
Layer type Parameters Layer type Parameters
Convolution 32 filters of 3x3, ReLU Convolution 6 filters of 5x5, ReLU
Max-Pooling 2x2 Avg-Pooling 2x2, stride 2
Convolution 64 filters of 3x3, ReLU Convolution 16 filters of 5x5, ReLU
Max-Pooling 2x2 Avg-Pooling 2x2, stride 2
Convolution 64 filters of 3x3, ReLU Fully connected 120 units, ReLU
Fully connected 128 units, ReLU Fully connected 84 units, ReLU
Softmax 10 units Softmax 10 units
#5 #6, [4]
Layer type Parameters Layer type Parameters
Convolution 32 filters of 5x5, ReLU Convolution 32 filters of 3x3, ReLU
Avg-Pooling 2x2, stride 2 Convolution 32 filters of 3x3, ReLU
Convolution 64 filters of 5x5, ReLU Max-Pooling 2x2
Avg-Pooling 2x2, stride 2 Dropout 0.25
Fully connected 200 units, ReLU Convolution 64 filters of 3x3, ReLU
Fully connected 100 units, ReLU Convolution 64 filters of 3x3, ReLU
Softmax 10 units Max-Pooling 2x2
Fully connected 512 units, ReLU
Dropout 0.5
Softmax 10 units
#7, [13] #8, [16]
Layer type Parameters Layer type Parameters
Convolution 32 filters of 5x5, ReLU Convolution 32 filters of 5x5, ReLU
Avg-Pooling 2x2, stride 2 Convolution 64 filters of 5x5, ReLU
Convolution 64 filters of 5x5, ReLU Fully connected 384 units, ReLU
Avg-Pooling 2x2, stride 2 Fully connected 192 units, ReLU
Fully connected 512 units, ReLU Softmax 10 units
Softmax 10 units
pooling, and fully-connected layers. We chose convolutional architectures as an initial setting, as their
architecture configuration space is more complex and interesting compared to simple feedforward
networks with only fully connected layers. See Table 1 for a full definition of the architectures used.
We trained each model architecture for 100 epochs with DP-SGD, with a batch size of 250, 5 micro
batches, a fixed learning rate of 0.1, a clipping threshold of 1.0 and at two noise multipliers of 0.01
and 0.1.
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Figure 1: Results of training 8 neural architectures for 100 epochs on the CIFAR-10 image classifica-
tion task with DP-SGD and a batch size of 250, 5 micro batches, a fixed learning rate of 0.1 and a
clipping threshold of 1.0, at two different noise multipliers (0.01 and 0.1). (Best viewed in color.)
4 Results
Figure 1 shows the training results of the 8 different architectures on the CIFAR-10 machine learning
task, repeated three times in identical settings with two different noise multipliers. We can clearly see
that with a low noise multiplier model 6 performs best, but with a high noise multiplier model 6 comes
in second to last while model 2 performs best. As the noise multiplier is one of the hyperparameters
that determines the privacy level (besides epochs, batch size, and training set size, which are identical
for all results), this means that at different privacy levels, different architectures perform best. In
turn, this shows that, in a given set of architectures, it is not always the case that a single architecture
will perform best for all differential privacy settings. Therefore, it is also not guaranteed that an
architecture that performs best without differential privacy necessarily performs best in the differential
privacy setting since its performance will be dependent on the targeted privacy level. The raw results
and the code used to generate the graph can be found on GitHub 1.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated whether the architecture of a neural network can influence the accuracy
loss incurred through differential privacy constraints. Our findings show that this is the case; neural
network architectures that perform well in the non-private setting will not necessarily perform well in
the differentially private setting. Furthermore, we found that which architecture performs best also
depends on the chosen level of differential privacy.
The implications of our findings are two-fold: First, for research, our findings show that architectures
are only comparable at the same privacy level, as the relative ranking of architectures might differ
across privacy levels. Second, for practitioners, our findings show that best practices, experiences, or
architectures from the non-private setting cannot be easily transferred to the design of differentially
private neural networks. Rather, the model architecture has to be designed and tuned for specific
differential privacy settings; differential privacy cannot be treated as an afterthought.
Moreover, the design of neural networks is a challenging task that either takes a lot of resources to try
many different architectures through neural architecture search [6] or requires a good understanding
of neural network design from the modeler. Doing a neural architecture search in the plain setting




model. Searching for an architecture or optimizing hyperparameters in the differential privacy setting
does, however, consume privacy budget [17]. Therefore, spending more time on architecture search
or hyperparameter optimization will decrease the privacy budget available for the actual training,
which will decrease the number of epochs available for training; hence, it will probably reduce the
accuracy of the final model. As a consequence, neural architecture search is not easily applicable in
the differential privacy setting.
Instead, a good understanding of how to design neural network architectures in the differential privacy
setting is needed in order to maximize the available privacy budget for the actual training. But
as shown by our findings, the experience from the design of neural network architectures without
differential privacy constraints can only be transferred to the design of differentially private neural
network architectures to a limited degree. Therefore, we need to derive new best practices for the
design of architectures tailored specifically for differentially private neural networks, in order to
improve the applicability of privacy-preserving machine learning by reducing the accuracy loss
incurred by differential privacy constraints.
In our future work, we will derive best practices for the design of neural architectures under differential
privacy constraints. We will set up additional experiments across multiple classic machine learning
benchmarks. Subsequently, we will analyse the results, derive a set of candidate best practices and
test those on different benchmarks. We aim to also incorporate qualitative data from expert interviews
to even further advance the best practices for designing neural network architectures that perform
well under differential privacy constraints.
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